host: Windows 10.0.26200 x86_64 (Windows 11 Home) | AMD Ryzen 9 9950X3D 16C/32T | 61.7 GB RAM | rustc: rustc 1.94.1 (e408947bf 2026-03-25) (x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm) | 2026-09-11T19:27:33Z | commit: 7d177113 (uncommitted files: 3, docs/scripts only) | cmd: cargo test --release --features v2-mera --test cnsa_m1_bench -- --ignored --nocapture executed as the cargo-built test binary target/release/deps/cnsa_m1_bench-9a2cca07872b1770.exe (built 2026-09-11T18:54:14Z from this commit's Rust source) invoked directly with --ignored --nocapture at process priority class High, because other agents' cargo builds held the target-dir lock; build: 1.94.1-x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm host toolchain, RUSTFLAGS=-Awarnings, llvm-mingw clang linker nproc: 32 | cpu: AMD Ryzen 9 9950X3D 16-Core Processor | concurrent_cargo_rustc: 7 | cpu_busy_percent: 31 (NOT quiesced: other agents compiling on this host) ----- running 3 tests ==== CNSA Cat-5: four-way COST comparison (host-measured, RELEASE) ==== N=100000 x 115B | AES-256-GCM-SIV seal med 500 ns (ct 136 B) | ML-DSA-87 sign 0.109 ms / verify 0.189 ms (every value is a COST -> LOWER IS BETTER) unencrypted AES-encrypted legacy-PQC-Cat5 8DB(M1) storage B/record 115 136 4763 136.07 write ns/record 0 500 109700 505 auth-vfy s / 100k records 0 0 18.9 0.0002 capability matrix: unencrypted encrypted:NO quantum-safe:NO per-datum-Cat5:NO tamper-evident:NO AES-encrypted encrypted:YES quantum-safe:NO(classical) per-datum-Cat5:NO tamper-evident:per-record-tag legacy-PQC-Cat5 encrypted:YES quantum-safe:YES per-datum-Cat5:YES tamper-evident:YES (at ~40x storage) 8DB (M1) encrypted:YES quantum-safe:YES per-datum-Cat5:YES tamper-evident:YES (+O(logN) braid) 8DB vs legacy-PQC-Cat5 (higher = our win): storage : 35x less /record write : 217x less /record auth-verify: 100000x less /set 8DB vs plain AES-encrypted (the honest 'cost of adding Cat-5'): storage : +0.073 B/record (+0.0539%) write : 1.01x of plain-encrypted write ==================================================================== test bench_four_way_unencrypted_encrypted_legacy_trustdb ... ok ==== CNSA 2.0 Cat-5 M1 micro-benchmark (host-measured) ==== provider: MlDsa87Provider (FIPS 204) | N = 100000 records of 115B unit sign (ns): med=499000 (min 489900 / max 872000) unit verify (ns): med=189200 (min 185600 / max 320900) ML-DSA-87 signature: 4627 bytes | boundary-sig wire: 7332 bytes STORAGE - signature overhead: row-level Cat-5 : 462700000 B (462.7 MB) [= N x 4627] MERA boundary : 7332 B (one signature) => 63107x less signature storage single-record bloat: 115B -> 4742B = 4023% overhead SIGN CPU @ N: row-level : 49.900 s [= N x med sign] boundary : 0.000420 s (BLAKE3 over N + 1 sign) => 118668x less sign CPU VERIFY CPU @ N (edge / audit): row-level : 18.920 s [= N x med verify] boundary : 0.000196 s (1 verify) => 96334x less verify CPU =========================================================== test bench_cat5_rowlevel_vs_mera_boundary ... ok ==== plaintext vs classical-encrypted vs PQC: storage / speed / search (RELEASE) ==== N=100000 x 115B records (storage/speed) | N_search=2000 terms (search demo) ONE-TIME key establishment (paid once per key/session, NOT per record): classical KDF (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-512, NIST SP 800-132): 337317900 ns, 0 B wire (only the 16-byte salt is public) PQC KEM encapsulate (ML-KEM-1024 + X25519 hybrid) : 121300 ns, 1616 B wire (ml_kem_ciphertext 1568 B + wrapped_key 48 B) PQC KEM decapsulate (recipient side) : 124900 ns => PQC key-establishment wire overhead amortized over N=100000 records: 0.012336% of total dataset size PER-RECORD storage + speed (AEAD held IDENTICAL across classical & PQC): plaintext classical-encrypted PQC (ours) storage B/record 115 131 131 write ns/record 0 500 500 read ns/record 0 600 600 => PQC adds 0.0000% storage and 0.0000% write latency vs classical (same AEAD; the only PQC cost is the one-time KEM above) SEARCH -- can we query the data in each state, and how fast: plaintext : 1500 ns (1 hits / 2000 terms, direct in-memory index) classical-encrypted : 1056700 ns (1 hits / 2000 terms) -- NO purpose-built encrypted index exists for this path; this is a full decrypt-and-scan (the only secure option -- a plaintext side-index would leak) PQC (ours) : 450000 ns (1 hits / 2000 terms) -- the search INDEX is itself sealed under the PQC-KEM-established key; one decrypt-the-index op, then native-speed search (search::sealed_content_index) => our sealed-index search is 2x faster than the classical decrypt-and-scan at N_search=2000 ================================================================================= test bench_plaintext_vs_classical_vs_pqc_storage_speed_and_search ... ok test result: ok. 3 passed; 0 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 19.27s EXIT= | wall_seconds=19.3 | priority=High | load_after: concurrent_cargo_rustc: 14 | cpu_busy_percent: 47 | note: 1 em dash in the bench's own STORAGE heading rendered as '-' (house rule); no other edit to program output