Supporting methodology and editorial history

Retained October 9, 2026. These passages preserve scope and revision history; they are not new test results. Source references remain in the article.

Method note: the recorded result is the generic Linux replay dated September 17, 2026, with product source 29dd1584e. It is vendor engineering evidence, not an independent assessment, benchmark ranking, cryptographic certification or government authorization. The evidence record retains prior attempts and separates generic, lifecycle and mission-specific builds.

This was an 8Braid-operated run on an existing Ubuntu WSL host. It demonstrates repeatable execution of that package; an outside evaluator still needs to make its own finding. The complete, authenticated external handoff remains in preparation.

A digest also needs a trusted origin. Matching the value delivered through an established channel checks byte identity; downloading an archive and its hash together does not, by itself, authenticate the publisher. Publisher authentication, offline prerequisite packaging, disclosure and licensing review, and evaluator-only retrieval remain explicit external-release requirements for this package.

Our recorded replay used an existing host and its installed Python, Docker and retained runtime image. It should not be presented as an outside organization's assessment or proof that every target platform is ready. The proposed next step is a named package on an agreed environment, with those handoff requirements completed first.

Cryptographic testing has its own boundaries. NIST distinguishes its ACVTS demonstration and production environments. Demonstration-server results are useful supporting evidence; they do not confer a production algorithm validation certificate or FIPS 140-3 module validation.